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The Untold Story 
of India’s Economy
D. Rajeev Sibal 
As India looks towards further liberalisation, it must fi rst prepare its economic institutions by re-orienting them from managing the economy to regulating the economy. 
Without an enhancement of regulatory capacity, increased liberalisation will simply 
perpetuate corruption and further inequality. By improving regulatory capacity, the state 
can better focus on the socio-economic aspects of governance that will be so important 
for India’s future. In order to better direct and manage institutional change in India, we 
must fi rst look to history to understand how India’s economic infrastructure was built. 
Rather than focusing solely on GDP projections, infl ation fi gures, and unemployment rates, this article 
discusses a more subtle but much more infl uential aspect of India’s economy. Assessing India’s economic 
trajectory by connecting the modern economy to history and politics highlights the historical driving forces 
that structured India’s market, and anticipates the changes those structures may undergo in the future. 
The continued development of India is contingent on having the institutional capacity to support growth. 
Table 1:  India Economic Forecast
% 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
GDP Growth 7.8% 8.3% 8.4% 8.5% 8.6%
Industrial Production Growth 6.0% 7.5% 7.9% 7.9% 7.9%
Unemployment Rate 9.8% 9.6% 9.3% 8.9% 9.9%
Consumer Price Infl ation 8.5% 8.4% 7.9% 7.5% 6.7%
Short-term Interbank Rate 9.9% 9.3% 12.0% 11.8% 11.8%
Government Balance 
(% of GDP)
-5.2% -4.7% -5.0% -4.3% -3.9%
Source:  Economist Intelligence Unit as of Dec 1st 2011
POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT
Markets are rarely left to their own devices because they operate within a political economic framework 
where the distribution of wealth is inherently political. The structural foundations of a country are 
determined by how that distribution of wealth and political interference shapes the domestic market. 
In India, the most obvious example of market intervention is its closed capital account. 
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The fact that capital controls exist is a serious 
consideration in understanding the Indian economy. 
Most economists deride India’s capital controls and 
proclaim that India should immediately move to an 
open capital account and further liberalise its markets. 
So why doesn’t Manhoman Singh, the fearless 
liberaliser of the 1990s who, as fi nance minister, 
navigated India through a deep fi nancial crisis and 
spurred economic growth via partial liberalisation, 
further open the economy? What would be the 
consequences of freer capital fl ows? Is government 
intervention not inhibiting economic growth? 
Indian technocrats and politicians are being neither 
obstinate nor politically motivated when they decide 
to restrict capital fl ows and monitor the movement of 
the Rupee in international markets. Certainly politics 
plays a role. Millions of India’s poor tend to protest 
against liberalisation, as demonstrated by the recent 
proposal to liberalise India’s retail sector to permit 
greater foreign participation. But the politics behind 
India’s capital controls are not tied to party politics. 
When the right-leaning opposition, BJP, was in power, 
Prime Minister Vajpayee was also unable or unwilling 
to enact broad liberalisation measures. India has 
liberalised very slowly because of the microeconomic 
realities faced by the poorest Indian citizens. 
Elections are won or lost, and livelihoods made 
or broken, because of domestic food prices. The 
Green Revolution in India that began in the 
1960s helped prevent famine but not hunger, 
especially during severe droughts in the mid 1960s, 
early 1970s, and late 1980s. One of the great marvels 
of modern technology has indeed been India’s ability 
to feed itself, but with severe overpopulation and 
underdeveloped infrastructure, the balance between 
supply and demand remains precarious. 
The impact of food price volatility is therefore keenly 
felt in India. Empirically, the power of food prices is 
most vividly demonstrated by the Indian Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). Table 2 compares India’s CPI to 
a developed country’s CPI. Food and core staples 
comprise practically the entirety of the index in India 
because of the extreme poverty that many face in 
the country. A slight movement in food prices can 
have a disastrous effect on India’s poor, who are 
ill prepared to cope with volatility. Food prices and 
domestic infl ation are key incentives to keep the 
capital account closed, an important consideration 
that is frequently overlooked.
THE SOURCES OF INDIA’S ECONOMIC STRUCTURES
When the British left India, many wondered whether 
the Indian subcontinent would remain as one country 
or divide into dozens of more-or-less sovereign states. 
India is a nation of nations. Historically, each region 
had developed under its own political system, being 
united only because of foreign imperialists. The 
British managed India through a system of patronage 
that preserved a certain amount of independence 
regionally. British interests in India were principally 
economic, so they left the politics to the locals – as 
best they could.  As a result, when India began to 
contemplate independence, it was far from certain 
that it would be a single country.
Table 2:  Consumer Price Index
% India UK
Food 47.13% 16.00%
Housing 16.41% 12.90%
Clothing 7.00% 6.20%
Fuel 5.48% N/A
Recreation N/A 14.70%
Other 23.95% 50.20%
Source: Government of India Ministry of Statistics; UK Offi ce for National Statistics
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Despite the legacy of fragmentation, Gandhi, Nehru, 
and many of India’s leaders envisioned a united India 
surviving the British. The economic ideology of India’s 
forefathers focused on Swadeshi, or self-suffi ciency. 
Swadeshi was used not only as a political strategy 
to undermine British economic interests before 
independence but also as the basis for structuring 
India’s economic foundations after independence. 
Gandhi envisioned an independent India that was 
self-suffi cient and largely agrarian. Nehru was a bit 
more grounded in economic reality and strove for 
industrialisation, but in a manner that was reliant on 
domestic industry. At the core of both Gandhi and 
Nehru’s vision was a powerful federal government 
at the centre that could promote national unity and 
facilitate progressive social change. 
As India sought to organise its economy, it looked 
abroad for successful models that would enable 
it to industrialise rapidly. The centralised systems 
of the USSR and China were appealing to India 
because of the social equality that their systems strove 
for. Japan was appealing because of its cooperative, 
self-reliant economic model that helped it develop 
rapidly. India was by no means communist, but 
the country had a severe problem of poverty and 
underdevelopment. The cooperative, equality-driven 
systems of India’s neighbours were therefore more 
attractive than the uncertainty of Western Capitalism, 
and the lesson Indian policymakers drew was that 
countries that industrialised late required state 
intervention to succeed. The centralised institutions 
of British India were easily adapted to the centrally 
planned model that succeeded it in independent India. 
Today, the remnants of the state-centred bureaucracy 
continue to infl uence economic governance. 
PHASES OF INDIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
India’s economic history is commonly divided into 
four periods: roughly independence to 1965, 1966 
to 1980, 1981 to 1991, and post 1991. The periods 
are defi ned as such because they mark clear breaks 
in economic policies in India and can be identifi ed 
with shifts in economic growth rates (see table 3).
The fi rst period is tied to Nehru’s reign as president. 
Under Nehru’s leadership, state-centred economic 
planning reigned. Planners sought to combat 
economic stagnation and extreme poverty through 
state driven policies. The top-down economic model 
helped sustain relatively stable economic growth 
for two reasons. First, India was undergoing a 
phase of rapid industrialisation and recovering from 
years of economic suppression under the British. 
Second, and more importantly, Nehru was largely 
able to implement his economic programmes 
because the powerful Indian Congress Party dominated 
the country politically and held suffi cient power to 
ensure that the plans reached the microeconomy. 
Table 3:  Indian Economic Performance
Phase 1
1951-1965
Phase II
1965-1981
Phase III
1981-1991
Phase IV
post 1991*
Key Prime 
Ministers
Nehru Shastri
I. Gandhi
Desai
I. Gandhi
R. Gandhi
Rao
Vajpayee
Singh
Compound Annual 
Growth Rate**
4.0% 3.5% 5.0% 6.3%
Growth Rate 
Standard Deviation
2.4% 3.7% 2.1% 2.3%
Years of sub 
0% Growth
1 2 0 0
*data included to 2009
**GDP data is based on prices since 1951 and base year of 1999-00
Sources: Reserve Bank of India Statistical Database, Sibal - Trajectories of Indian Capitalism (2011) 
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Nehru’s charisma helped build consensus around 
his vision of India, which translated into political 
economic coherence. An activist developmental 
state was more successful in the fi rst phase of India’s 
economic path because of the broad based consensus 
that existed politically.
When Nehru passed away, the underlying political 
consensus that held the Congress Party together 
began to fall away and natural cleavages in Indian 
politics – representing the diversity of social classes, 
ethnicities, and nations – began to infl uence the 
political order. The Congress Party was still able to 
win majorities but in order to lead successive Prime 
Ministers Shastri and Indira Gandhi had to bargain. In 
this second phase, interests had to be reconciled and 
that was often accomplished through fi nancial means. 
Members of the Congress Party needed each other 
to stay in power and control the national purse but 
Members of Parliament had vested interests that were 
largely incoherent at a group level. The net effect of the 
underlying cleavages meant that the post-Nehru period 
was marked by a period of incoherence between the 
macroeconomy and microeconomy. 
While the federal government continued to implement 
centrally driven economic policies in line with state-
defi ned developmental needs, many technocrats 
disagreed with the policies, sometimes for economic 
reasons and sometimes for political reasons. 
Moreover, policymakers, on occasion, simply took 
advantage of the institutional weaknesses inherent 
in a country as complicated as India to steal from 
the system. Without proper execution of policy in 
the microeconomy, economic planning is futile. 
Nevertheless, the dream of Swadeshi persisted. The 
state was viewed as a conduit through which a post-
modern Indian state could be facilitated. Public sector 
corporations could enable cooperation between and 
amongst different ethnic groups and castes, much 
better than could the private sector. 
Focusing on national unity, at the expense of 
economic development, cost India dearly. India’s 
economy had anaemic growth and extreme volatility 
between 1965 and 1981. The standard deviation of 
India’s economic growth rates was greater than the 
compound annual growth rate over the period. The 
inability for the federal government to build consensus 
in this second phase of India’s economic history is best 
represented by Indira Gandhi. 
During her fi rst period as Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi 
worked hard to expand the powers of the state by 
controlling ever greater portions of the national 
economy. She constrained domestic businesses with the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969, 
nationalised banking with the Banking Companies Act 
of 1969, controlled productivity through the Industrial 
Licensing Acts of 1970 and 1973, and kept out foreign 
investment with the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 
of 1973. The symbolic culmination of this increase in 
state power in Indian politics was the Prime Minister’s 
two years of emergency rule beginning in 1975. 
The top-down model of state-led economic 
development was unsustainable without political 
consensus and the participation of microeconomic 
actors. The diversity of India was proving too much 
to handle for state planners. When Indira Gandhi 
returned to power in the early 1980s (because 
competing political parties were unable to build a 
majority consensus in Parliament), she knew that 
an alternative economic paradigm was needed. 
Business interests began to be permitted a more 
active voice in economic planning in India, especially 
after Indira Gandhi’s assassination and the rise of 
Rajiv Gandhi. The state continued to be at the centre 
of the system, but businesses were given freedom 
to operate without as much state interference. 
In this third phase in the 1980s, with businesses better 
able to drive effi ciency and react to supply and demand 
incentives, the economy took off. The state, however, 
continued to manage capital fl ows and business in 
certain sectors. The costs of state intervention proved 
to be insurmountable in the early 1990s and India, like 
many of its developing country peers, succumbed to 
a fi scally induced debt crisis. India had to turn to the 
International Monetary Fund for fi nancing, and the 
crisis helped usher in change that seemed impossible 
merely one or two years earlier.
The reforms of Manmohan Singh loosened the 
clamps on the economy and allowed economic 
stakeholders to organise themselves to drive 
greater economic effi ciency. Almost immediately the 
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macroeconomy responded, achieving consistently 
strong economic growth. Millions have been lifted 
out of poverty and a new, burgeoning middle class 
has established itself in India. That India achieved 
such growth with relatively limited liberalisation, 
however, is surprising. While this fourth period 
is marked by greater separation between the 
government and the economy, the state continues 
to run a number of enterprises, maintain control over 
foreign exchange, manage productivity in certain 
sectors, and protect labour through rigid laws. 
India took major strides in permitting enterprises to 
react to market signals but maintained control over 
India’s exposure to the global economy by retaining 
a tightly controlled capital account. 
The phases of Indian Capitalism are outlined to 
demonstrate the role that the state has played in 
economic performance. Developmental states are only 
successful when economic stakeholders are fi ghting 
for the same goals. Interests must be protected and 
integrated into the model of development. The 
challenge in India is that the heterogeneity of interests 
proved diffi cult to align. After independence, under 
Nehru, the political cohesiveness and dominance 
of the Congress Party permitted a form of state-
based capitalism to be relatively successful. Once 
the post-independence euphoria had worn off, 
however, the cooperation necessary to operate a 
developmental state no longer existed. During phase 
two the developmental state gradually morphed 
into an autocratic state, but India’s democratic roots 
proved durable and elections were quickly restored. 
In phase three, businesses were given greater freedoms 
to manage production, and the fourth phase made 
permanent the removal of the state from certain 
aspects of the economy. 
The failure of the developmental state has proven that 
the state, in India, should not be playing an active 
role in managing productivity in the economy and 
that economic stakeholders can effi ciently organise 
themselves. The economy has performed best when 
economic stakeholders are allowed to react to 
supply and demand incentives in the marketplace 
and organise amongst themselves with minimal 
interference. The challenge, however, is aligning the 
economic performance with India’s political demand 
for broader distribution of economic wealth. While 
certain segments of the Indian population have 
benefi tted from liberalisation, many have not. The 
state has tried to protect those left behind through 
policies that attempt to shield India’s poor from the 
volatility of globalisation.
LOOKING FORWARD
The Indian economy operates on a delicate balance 
of state intervention and free market principles. 
In the past two decades, layers of the state have 
been gradually worn away after having been built 
up over centuries of centrally organised economic 
coordination. Indian companies have thrived with 
liberalisation, revealing the entrepreneurial spirit of 
the Indian people. How the state governs the market 
remains one of the biggest potential barriers to future 
success. Economic institutions are slowly moving away 
from managing output towards being regulators, and 
they should continue in that direction. 
The fact that the state continues to have a heavy 
hand in the market should be no surprise given 
the history of India’s economic governance. The 
pace of change in governing institutions usually 
lags that of the marketplace. In developing 
countries, where liberalisation often results from 
new policies after state-backed regimes essentially 
go bankrupt, political institutions are ill-equipped 
to handle the dynamism of a liberal marketplace. 
 The fact that India has liberalised slowly can actually 
be considered somewhat benefi cial for the political 
aspects of institutional change. 
Looking ahead, the form and function of state 
institutions, and how they manage and/or regulate the 
market, represents a bottleneck for further economic 
expansion. India is ranked 132nd in the World Bank/
IFC Doing Business Index, one spot behind the West 
Bank and Gaza. In the categories where India’s ranking 
is the poorest, dealing with construction permits 
and enforcing contracts, India has a rank of 181 
and 182, respectively, out of 183 countries ranked. 
As long as the state maintains a focus on managing 
the economy, ineffi cient allocation of resources will 
continue. India’s Institutions are built on legacies of 
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colonialism and state dominated capitalism. Indian 
institutions, instead, need to become more transparent 
and focus on regulating the economy. 
India’s ability to liberalise its capital account is 
entirely dependent on state institutions being able 
to adequately regulate the marketplace and manage 
the systemic risk that results from increased capital 
fl ows. If left to their own devices, those institutions 
will continue to languish. The impetus for change 
will have to come from microeconomic actors whose 
growth prospects are being constrained. Even 
something as simple as the Hazare anti-corruption 
movement in 2011 has instigated a push for change 
in India’s economic infrastructure. A cleaner, more 
transparent marketplace, with a more friendly 
business environment, will eventually allow the state 
to remove itself from the sectors of the economy 
where it continues to manage productivity. The state 
can then better focus on social programmes, such as 
education and healthcare, that provide a minimum 
standard for all of India’s citizens. 
The future for India is bright. As economists call for 
liberalisation, they should also be cognisant of context. 
Without institutional change and an enhancement of 
India’s regulatory capacity, increased liberalisation will 
simply perpetuate corruption and further inequality. 
Only through a re-orientation of the economic 
infrastructure will India be able to synthesise the fruits 
of liberalisation – greater foreign direct investment, 
deeper domestic market liquidity, and a fl oating 
exchange rate – into tangible economic growth, while 
containing the ills of liberalisation – increased food 
price volatility and fl ighty capital. 
As for India’s place in the global economy, given 
the vast developmental challenges that remain 
domestically, it would be diffi cult to imagine India 
asserting its economic dominance in international 
markets any time soon. Processes of institutional 
change tend to take decades rather than years, and, as 
a result, the rise of India as an economic superpower 
will only occur over a long period of time. ■ 
